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INTRA-ATTORNEY FEE SHARING
ARRANGEMENTS
THOMAS J. HALL* AND JOEL C. LEVY**
INTRODUCTION
The ethical and legal considerations applicable to the division of
legal fees between corresponding or cooperating attorneys stand
ripe for comment and criticism. With ever-increasing negativism
concerning the cost, competency and availability of legal services to
the American public, our profession cannot stand idly by and permit
once "customary" practices to continue, especially where those
practices are often of questionable legality and almost surely
unethical pursuant to applicable standards of professional responsi-
bility.
Growing specialization within the Bar, coupled with new fears
of challenges to attorneys' professional competency, would seem to
indicate that even with the relaxation of restrictions on professional
advertising by attorneys, the referral of clients to more qualified
practitioners should logically be on the increase. With specializa-
tion, the incidence of referrals should expand beyond the historical
scope of personal injury and commercial collection matters, both of
which are generally contracted pursuant to contingent fee agree-
ments.
Below, the writers survey the historical development of the legal
and ethical controls placed upon intra-attorney fee arrangements
with the intention of providing the reader with a review and
analysis of the present state of substantive law and ethical consider-
ations affecting the sharing and division of fees between attorneys.
It is the writers' ultimate objective to provide the Bench and Bar
with a critical analysis of the standards applicable to intra-attorney
fee arrangements. It is hoped, in turn, that this will promote
greater recognition of the considerations necessary in contracting
and enforcing such fee arrangements and emphasize the connected
ethical responsibility to the client.
*Member of Indiana Bar
**Member of Indiana Bar
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HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Substantive Law
The "customs" of referral or finder's fees and the sharing of fees
between cooperating attorneys have both long been a part of the
practice of law in this country.
Historically, in America the sharing or division of fees between
attorneys arose most often in two typical situations. In the first, an
attorney referred a client along with every known aspect of a
particular legal matter to another practitioner. This was often
based upon the receiving attorney's location or trial expertise. The
referring attorney often expected, and generally received, a referral
or finder's fee. The genesis of such a referral or finder's fee in
America may well be traceable to the practice of countryside
solicitors in England who, when faced with litigation, would
associate London solicitors as agents. An agent would in turn retain
a barrister from the Inns of Court to take full charge of the
litigation, with the custom being that the referring solicitor would
share in one-third of the resulting fee.' In the second situation, the
referring attorney engaged the receiving attorney as co-counsel,
again possibly because of his trial expertise, and participated to
some degree in the handling of the matter as well as in the resulting
fee.
Established general rules evolved in early American substantive
law to control disputes which resulted from such intra-attorney fee
arrangements. In nearly every instance, the parties to such disputes
were attorneys or their heirs, and the legal matter at issue had been
contracted on a contingent fee basis. Where the effort of an attorney
was limited solely to the referral of a legal matter to a receiving
attorney, "custom" arguably required that the corresponding attor-
ney remit a portion of the fee collected to the referring attorney as a
referral or finder's fee.
This "custom" of compensating a referring attorney for the mere
referral of business has often been recognized by American trial
and appellate courts in their resolution of fee disputes between
attorneys.2 Recognition of referral fees has typically been made in
an evidentiary context. The question has most often been the
admissibility of evidence concerning the existence and recognition
of such a "custom" presented to support a claim for a referral or
1. J. COHEN, THE LAW: BUSINESS OR PROFESSION 225 (1916).
2. See generally Annot., 73 A.L.R.2d 991 § 5 (1960); 1 R. SPEISER, ATTORNEY'S
FEES § 6:18 (1973) [hereinafter cited as SPEISER].
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finder's fee.3 Even of recent date, this "custom" has been elevated in
status to include now-forsaken minimum fee schedules. 4
In the second situation, involving some sharing by both or all
cooperating counsel in the services performed or responsibilities
assumed in connection with the referred legal matter, American
substantive law provided definitive guidelines. The general rule
permitted cooperating attorneys to agree expressly upon the divi-
sion of the expected fee in any proportions which they deemed
appropriate, regardless of their comparative expertise or their
relative participation in the handling of the legal matter. If no such
express agreement was made, the court implied an agreement to
divide the resulting fee equally based upon the presumed existence
of either a special partnership or joint venture between the attor-
neys. 5
These general rules and capsulized observations concern at-
tempts by American trial and appellate courts to apply only
definitive substantive law to intra-attorney fee disputes. Clearly,
the modern-day problems of intra-attorney fee arrangements
involve questions of both substantive law and professional responsi-
bility. As evidenced historically by these general rules, courts
determining intra-attorney fee disputes most often viewed the issues
before them as ones turning solely upon substantive law without
consideration of ethical standards.6 More recently, some state
appellate courts have ventured beyond the rote application of
substantive law to recognize and apply ethical standards to such
disputes as either pronouncements of public policy or as an equiva-
3. Parker v. Gartside, 178 Il1. App. 634 (1913); Cost v. Dean, 161 Pa. Super. Ct.
160, 54 A.2d 70 (1947).
4. Compare Palmer v. Breyfogle, 217 Kan. 128, 535 P.2d 955 (1975), with
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar Ass'n, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
5. For examples of the enforcement of contracts for the unequal sharing of fees
without reference to or consideration of the proportionate sharing of services or
responsibility, see Monahan v. Heirich, 4 Ill. App. 2d 373, 124 N.E.2d 39 (1955);
Sterling v. Miller, 2 App. Div.2d 900,157 N.Y.S.2d 145 (1956); In re Allen St. in City of
New York, 148 Misc. 488, 266 N.Y.S. 277 (Sup. Ct. 1933); Gagle v. Loeser, 143 Ohio St.
362, 55 N.E.2d 580 (1944). For applications of a joint venture or special partnership
theory without an express agreement, see SPEISER, supra note 2, at §§ 6:12, 6:13.
Compare Romine v. Frank, 124 Ind. App. 465, 118 N.E.2d 900 (1954), and Komisarow
v. Lansky, 138 Ind. App. 351, 219 N.E.2d 913 (1966).
6. See, eg., Swacher v. Pennroad Corp., 30 Del. Ch. 495, 57 A.2d 63(1947), cert.
denied, 333 U.S. 862 (1948); English v. McConnell, 23 Ill. 461 (1860); In re Allen St. in
City of New York, 148 Misc. 488, 266 N.Y.S. 277 (Sup. Ct. 1933); Gagle v. Loeser, 143
Ohio St. 362, 55 N.E.2d 580 (1944). See also SPEISER, supra note 2.
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lent of substantive law.' Prior to reviewing and discussing these
more realistic attempts to resolve intra-attorney fee disputes, some
mention should be made of the historical development of ethical
proscriptions concerning such fee-sharing arrangements.
Early Ethical Standards and Their Application
Ethical standards have long forbidden the practice of remitting
referral fees to forwarding attorneys based solely upon the broker-
age of legal business and clients. The American Bar Association's
first offical condemnation of referral or finder's fees took the form of
Canon 28 of the Association's Canons of Professional Ethics,
adopted in 1908. Canon 28 generally proscribed the payment of
consideration to anyone for the referral of legal work.8 In 1928 the
American Bar Association added Canon 34 which more particularly
concerned the division of fees between attorneys. In its original
form, Canon 34 provided:
No division of fees for legal services is proper, except with
another lawyer, based upon a division of service or
responsibility. But the established custom of sharing
commissions at a commonly accepted rate, upon,collection
of commercial claims between forwarder and receiver,
the one being a lawyer and the other not (being a
compensation for valuable services rendered by each), is
not condemned hereby, where it is not prohibited by
statute.9
This initial provision specifically permitted the "customary"
payment for the mere referral of commercial collection claims even
where the forwarder is not an attorney. 10 A 1933 amendment to
Canon 34 deleted the term "established custom" and the paren-
thetical provision in its second sentence. It also restricted the term
"commercial claim" by requiring that such commercial claims be
"liquidated" for a referral fee to be permitted. Another major
revision of Canon 34 in 1937 deleted the entire second sentence
restated above, leaving Canon 34 to read in its entirety as follows:
7. Palmer v. Breyfogle, 217 Kan. 128, 535 P.2d 955 (1975); Moffat v. Cresap, 33
App. Div. 2d 54, 304 N.Y.S.2d 719 (1969); McFarland v. George, 316 S.W.2d 662 (Mo.
App. 1958).
8. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 28, as adopted by the American
Bar Association House of Delegates in 1908.
9. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 34, as adopted by the American
Bar Association House of Delegates in 1928.
10. Compare the present schedule of commissions and fees promulgated by the
Commercial Law League of America, reviewed in SPEISER, supra note 2, at § 6:22.
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"No division of fees for legal services is proper, except with another
lawyer, based upon a division of service or responsibility.""1
Thus, subsequent to 1937, the ethical standards promulgated by
the American Bar Association condemned without question one
attorney's payment of a referral or finder's fee to another. Com-
menting upon this revised version of Canon 34 in his treatise on
Legal Ethics, Henry S. Drinker stated:
There was long at the bar a practice or custom whereby,
when a lawyer, with authority from his client, forwarded
a case to another lawyer for attention in the latter's
jurisdiction, or merely recommended one, the forwarding
attorney was allowed 1/3 of the fee earned by his corres-
pondent. This was in the nature of a "Finder's Fee," and
was payable irrespective of any real service performed or
responsibility assumed by the forwarding lawyer. It was
obviously the purpose of Canon 34 to condemn this
[practice] .... 12
The mandate of revised Canon 34 further required that hence-
forth, all sharing of fees between attorneys was to be based upon the
division of service or responsibility. Left unanswered by Canon 34
was the manner or means by which a conscientious attorney, court
or ethical committee could comparatively measure the respective
services performed or responsibilities assumed by cooperating
attorneys in attempting to effect a proper division of fees or evaluate
one already contracted or performed.
A review of the decisions of state appellate courts rendered
during the second and third quarters of this century reflects partial
recognition of the basic principles of Canon 34 and at least
superficial attempts by courts to integrate its provisions into the
judicial resolution of intra-attorney fee disputes. However, as a
general rule the courts continued to enforce strictly express intra-
attorney fee arrangements without regard to the proportion of
services rendered or responsibility assumed by each attorney. They
also found implied agreements for equal division of fees where no
such express agreement could be pinpointed, provided that the
claiming attorney had rendered any recognizable service other than
the referral itself.
11. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 34, as adopted by the American
Bar Association House of Delegates in 1937.
12. H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 186 (1953) [hereinafter cited as DRINKER]. See
also Drinker, Brokerage v. Law Profession, 7 U. FLA. L REV. 433 (1955).
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Nevertheless, whether as a response to the tightening standard
of Canon 34 or as a matter of public policy, a number of state
appellate court decisions seemed to recognize and enforce the basic
premise of Canon 34, requiring that an attorney sharing in a fee also
share in the services and responsibilities which generate it.13 Courts'
recognition of this requirement of participation in the handling of
legal matters may perhaps be explained by an apparent effort by
unrewarded forwarding attorneys to guise their expected referral
fee as compensation for "services rendered. '14 In denying such
claims for referral fees, courts regularly looked to substantive law.
For example, courts based their reasoning upon contractual con-
cepts such as a lack of consideration15 or the failure of one
contracting party to perform the obligations imposed upon him
pursuant to a bilateral contract which impliedly required that both
or all attorneys contribute to the services performed.16 These
exemplary holdings reflect the understandable tendency of most
appellate courts to continue to resolve intra-attorney fee disputes by
relying upon principles of substantive law rather than delving into
the rationale or interpretation of the ethical standards which clearly
apply.
In contrast to the foregoing courts' reliance upon substantive
law alone, the appellate courts of New York established an approach
to intra-attorney fee disputes which essentially incorporated the
proscriptions of Canon 34 as a principle of public policy having the
equivalent status ot substantive law. In 1937, a New York Supreme
Court decision held that an attempt to enforce a contract for a
"commission" based upon a referral of a legal matter contravened
New York public policy. 17 Thereafter, New York appellate courts
upheld dismissals of actions brought by an attorney, or his estate, in
an effort to share in a legal fee where the complaint failed to allege
that the cause of action was based upon the actual sharing of
services or responsibility in the handling of the underlying legal
matter. 8 More recently in 1969, the New York Supreme Court
13. Swacher v. Pennroad Corp., 30 Del. Ch. 495, 57 A.2d 63 (1947); Gagle v.
Loeser, 143 Ohio St. 362, 55 N.E.2d 580 (1944); Cost v. Dean, 161 Pa. Super. Ct. 160,54
A.2d 70 (1947).
14. Swacher v. Pennroad Corp., 30 Del. Ch. 495, 57 A.2d 63 (1947); Palmer v.
Breyfogle, 217 Kan. 128, 535 P.2d 955 (1975); Doherty v. Ginsburg, 346 Mass. 421, 193
N.E.2d 677 (1963); Krinsky v. Smith, - Mass. App. Ct. -, 312 N.E.2d 591 (1974).
15. See note 14 supra.
16. Doherty v. Ginsburg, 346 Mass. 421, 183 N.E.2d 677 (1963).
17. Clark v. Robinson, 252 App. Div. 857, 299 N.Y.S. 474 (1937).
18. Silver v. Paulson, 285 App. Div. 1059, 139 N.Y.S.2d 456(1955); Abrahamson
v. Sperling, 162 Misc. 813, 295 N.Y.S. 165 (1937).
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applied Canon 34 to conclude that, as a matter of public policy, the
estate of a deceased attorney could not rely upon a partnership
agreement which provided for the surviving partner's sharing of a
fee with the decedent's estate based solely upon the fact that the
business had "originated" with the decedent. 19
The New York appellate courts' approach and rationale in
applying Canon 34 is exemplified by the following statement from
the 1965 opinion rendered by the Second Department for the
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court:
This Canon is designed, in part, to keep the profession of
law from becoming an ordinary business. It gives
substance to the admonition of Canon 12 that "the pro-
fession is a branch of the administration of justice and not
a mere money-getting trade." Canon 34 thus condemns
both the "finders fee," payable regardless of the services
performed or responsibility assumed by a finding attor-
ney, as well as the unearned divided fee, taken by an
attorney who has assumed the role of an "attorney of
record" but who, in fact, has neither rendered services nor
assumed responsibility in the handling of the case.20
The New York appellate courts clearly have interpreted and
applied the basic mandates of Canon 34 which abhors referral or
finder's fees and which requires that for an attorney to share in a
fee, he must perform some legal service. Furthermore, the New
York appellate courts stand alone as the first to apply uniformly
Canon 34 as public policy which seemingly carries the import of
substantive law. Nevertheless, the New York courts have avoided
any application of Canon 34 which required that they comparatively
evaluate legal services performed or responsibilities assumed by
cooperating attorneys. The most recent New York Supreme Court
decision citing Canon 34 states its interpretation and application of
that provision as follows:
Under Canon 34 of the former Canon of Ethics, in effect
when this fee division agreement was made .... there was
no professional impropriety in agreeing to an equal
division of the net fee without a concomitant agreement
for an equal division of the work and responsibility,
provided there was some division of services and responsi-
19. Moffat v. Cresap, 33 App. Div. 2d 54, 304 N.Y.S.2d 719 (1969).
20. Greenwald v. Zyvith, 23 App. Div. 2d 201, 259 N.Y.S.2d 387 (1965).
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bility, and the party seeking to enforce the agreement
actually performed some substantial services.21
The court held that the performance of some initial joint research
of legal authorities and the preparation and securing of court
approval of a minor's compromise order constituted "substantial"
services justifying the court's enforcement of an express oral
agreement between two attorneys to share equally in the fee
generated in a wrongful death action.2
In the final analysis, the case law decisions of the New York
appellate courts and those of other jurisdictions footnoted above only
prohibit sharing of fees between attorneys where there has been
absolutely no sharing of services or responsibility. The decisions
prohibit a referral or finder's fee where an attempt has been made
to justify the claimed fee as one based upon the rendering of legal
services which are, upon close scrutiny, of little or no value. So long
as the attorney seeking to share in the fee can establish that he
participated in any measure with his co-counsel in the services
rendered or responsibilities assumed, it would seem that every
jurisdiction reviewed above would continue to enforce an implied
agreement for the equal sharing of fees between cooperating
attorneys, absent an express agreement to the contrary. No effort
was made in these decisions to proportionately evaluate legal
services rendered by cooperating attorneys or to define the scope of
the "services or responsibility" contemplated by Canon 34.
A 1958 decision of the Missouri Court of Appeals goes beyond
the decisions-of other jurisdictions in applying the dictates of Canon
34 by its attempt to provide a definition of such "services or
responsibility" and its factual application of that definition. In
McFarland v. George,23 the St. Louis Court of Appeals considered
the claim of Attorney William C. McLaughlin to recover a portion of
a fee allowed by a probate court to Attorney Lovell W. George as a
result of a will contest. McLaughlin asserted that he and George
had entered into an agreement to jointly represent an incompetent,
Mrs. Hauser, in her efforts to contest here deceased aunt's will. The
defendant, George, contended that McLaughlin's claim was based
solely upon his referral of Mrs. Hauser to George. Subsequent to
McLaughlin's death, the trial court entered judgment in favor of his
administrator for one-third of the fee earned, based at least in part
21. Bohm v. Golzberg, 69 Misc. 2d 469, 329 N.Y.S.2d 907 (Sup. Ct. 1972)
(emphasis added).
22. Id.
23. 316 S.W.2d 662 (Mo. App. 1958).
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upon the trial court's finding of a "special partnership or joint
venture existing by and between the plaintiffs decedent and de-
fendant, George . "...-24
In the appellate court, George contended that the trial court had
erred in implying a promise to share any fee awarded in the Hauser
will contest and based his argument essentially upon the dictates of
Canon 34, adopted by the Missouri Supreme Court as its Rule 4.34.
The Missouri court noted that two attorneys can enter into such a
special partnership and agree to the division of fees, "provided there
is a sharing of services or responsibility and the agreement provides
that the division of the fees is based upon a division of the services
rendered or responsibility assumed. '25 Continuing, the court held,
without further explanation, that it had "some doubt" that the
concept of joint venture could be applied to agreements between
attorneys who associate professionally to represent a client.26 This
statement contravenes what had previously been an accepted ration-
ale for justifying the equal division of fees where attorneys had not
struck an expressed bargain to the contrary.
Interpreting Canon 34, the Missouri Court of Appeals pointedly
stated that the mere referral or recommendation of a legal matter to
another lawyer, without the referring attorney's further participa-
tion in the matter, cannot be construed as the performing of services
or the discharging of responsibilities. Although this conclusion can
be implied from prior decisions in other jurisdictions, it had not
previously been verbalized in such express terms.
In reaching its result, the court made an exhaustive review of
the facts presented to the trial court and referenced a number of
similar decisions rendered by the New York appellate courts in
interpreting and applying Canon 34. In attempting to define the
actual meaning of an attorney's service and responsibility within the
context of Canon 34, the Missouri Appellate Court held:
In construing Supreme Court Rule 4.34 (Canon 34) little
difficulty is found in dealing with the word "service," but
the word "responsibility" on first blush seems to offer
more difficulty. The primary meaning of "responsibility"
as found in the dictionaries is the state of being answer-
able for an obligation. (Citations omitted). The term
"responsibility" includes judgment, skill, ability and
24. Id. at 669.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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capacity. (Citations omitted). Legal responsibility is the
state of one who is bound or obligated in law and justice to
do something. (Citations omitted).... The word "responsi-
bility" means the doing of something. Any other meaning
would render the rule meaningless. We agree with the
statement of Henry S. Drinker, in his work, Legal Ethics,
when discussing the rule at p. 186, where he said: "The
service and responsibility must, to be effective, relate to
the handling of the case." If the division of fees is to be
placed on the basis of how much service or responsibility
each contributed in connection with the legal services
rendered in the case, obviously, the responsibility called
for under the rule must be related to the legal services
rendered in the actual handling of the case.27
In applying these principles to the facts before it, the Missouri
Appellate Court noted that no express contract existed between
McLaughlin and George for the sharing of fees or for the sharing of
services and responsibility concerning Mrs. Hauser's will contest.
The court observed that at trial, McLaughlin had presented no
evidence which established his participation in the actual handling
of the will contest or any assumption of responsibility concerning it.
Therefore, the court reversed the trial court and held that no joint
venture or special partnership could be implied. Thus, for the first
time, a state appellate court appeared to render an opinion which
provided substance to the clear mandate of Canon 34 and which
went beyond a mere restatement of its underlying rationale.
Although McFarland v. George represents a major effort by a
state appellate court to weigh relative participation in the handling
of a legal matter, much of its informative discussion can arguably
be viewed as dicta. In reality, the claim before it amounted to one
for a referral fee based solely upon the referral of Mrs. Hauser to
George. Neither has the Missouri Court of Appeals subsequently
expanded upon McFarland v. George to establish any procedure to
assess the relative proportionate contributions of cooperating attor-
neys where a later dispute arises concerning the right to share in a
fee. In the 1964 decision of Witherton v. VanZandt,28 the same court
distinguished McFarland v. George on the grounds that it concerned
a claim for a mere referral by an attorney who had neither per-
formed legal services nor assumed responsibility in the handling of
the subject legal matter; the appellate court affirmed the trial
court's division of fees between attorneys on a sixty per cent/forty
27. Id. at 671.
28. 374 S.W.2d 631 (Mo. App. 1964).
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per cent basis. In reaching this result, the court provided little
analysis concerning the relative contributions of the cooperating
attorneys.
ETHICAL OPINIONS
Understandably, the state trial and appellate courts feel more
comfortable in the realm of substantive law. For this reason, the
courts' avoidance of applying ethical proscriptions to intra-attorney
fee disputes is at least explainable, if not justifiable. Thus, it would
seem that the ethical opinions of the American Bar Association and
various state bar associations should provide a more studied ap-
proach and analysis to guide the concerned practitioner.
Much to the contrary, the formal and informal ethical opinions
of the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on Profes-
sional Ethics (Committee) are found to be equally evasive and
analytically scant where the Committee has been queried regarding
the appropriate division of fees between cooperating counsel. In a
formal opinion issued in 1930, the Committee opined that it would
not be unethical for a corresponding attorney, to whom a case had
been referred pursuant to an agreement providing that the corres-
ponding attorney share in two-thirds of the fee, to fix the entire fee,
deduct his share, and remit the remainder to his referring co-
counsel. Commenting upon the proportionate division of fees, the
Committee took what has now become its established position in
stating, "The Committee will not pass upon questions concerning the
amount of an attorney's fee nor upon what constitutes a proper
division of fees between attorneys unless the fee is so excessive as to
constitute a misappropriation of the client's funds." 29
Ten years later, in its Formal Opinion 204, issued subsequent to
the final revision of Canon 34, the Committee rendered its most
extensive opinion on the issue of the division of fees between
attorneys. Pertinent portions of that opinion provide:
When an attorney merely brings about the employment of
another attorney but renders no services and assumes no
responsibility in the matter, a division of fees is improper.
Measuring the relative division of fees and responsibility
between associate attorneys is not within the province of
this Ethics Committee unless the resulting fee to the
client is flagrantly excessive ....
29. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, FORMAL OPINIONS No. 27 (May 5,
1930) [hereinafter cited as ABA FORMAL OPINIONS].
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[W]e adhere to our previous ruling that where a lawyer
merely brings about the employment of another lawyer
but renders no services and assumes no responsibility in
the matter, a division of fees is improper....
Any suggestion that the word "responsibility" may have
been intended to frustrate the intent of the canon, or may
properly be resorted to for that purpose, must be rejected.
The canon clearly states that the basis of the exception
permitting division of fees between lawyers is the division
of service or responsibility .... If, however, there be no
division of service or responsibility, a division of fees will
violate the canon.
It is assumed that the bar, generally, understands what
acts or conduct of a lawyer may constitute "services" to a
client within the intendiment of Canon 12. Such acts or
conduct, invariably, if not always, involve "responsibility"
on the part of the Lawyer, whether the word "responsi-
bility" be construed to denote the possible resultant legal
or moral liability on the part of the lawyer to the client, or
to others, or the onus of deciding what should or should
not be done in behalf of the client. The word "services" in
Canon 12 must be construed in this broad sense and may
apply to the selection and retainer of associate counsel as
well as to other acts or conduct in the client's behalf ...
In the letter of inquiry, ante, it is stated that the inquiring
firm is frequently "retained by other lawyers" and a doubt
is expressed whether there is involved any "responsibility"
on the part of the lawyer instructing us.
These statements seem to suggest an unwarrantedly re-
stricted construction of the word "responsibility" even if
the inquiry be confined to the act of retaining counsel.30
Thus, although continuing its abhorrence of the finder's or
referral fee in its most basic form, the Committee promotes what is,
30. ABA FORMAL OPINIONS No. 204 (November 28, 1940).
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at best, a broad application of the terms "services" and "responsi-
bility" as found in Canon 34. No effort is made in the opinion to
evaluate proportionate contributions to the handling of legal
matters. Furthermore, the Committee expressly suggests that the
mere selection and retention of associate counsel constitutes at least
some form of service or responsibility and that to justify a division of
fees, a referring attorney might well rely upon some vague, if not
contrived, "responsibility." This conclusion is clearly contrary to the
Missouri Appellate Court's holding in McFarland v. George.3l The
Committee's approach would seem to indicate that any sharing of
service or responsibility would justify a disproportionate sharing in
the resultant fee, a conclusion similar to that reached by the
appellate decisions of New York reviewed above.
Admittedly, any effort to value comparatively respective
services rendered or responsibilities assumed by cooperating
attorneys is extremely difficult. Assuming this fact as a premise,
the lack of concrete guidance provided by the Committee remains
classifiable as the proverbial "cop-out."
Other opinions of the Committee provide little additional help. A
formal opinion of the Committee issued prior to its Formal Opinion
204, partially quoted above, stated that a former member of a New
York law firm could justifiably accept a percentage of the gross fees
received by his former firm from his former clients whom he
referred to the firm. This position was based upon the fact that the
attorney, in some fashion, directed the rendering of those services by
correspondence.32 In a more recent informal opinion issued in 1960,
the Committee, relying upon Formal Opinion 204, stated the
following in response to an inquiry concerning the proportionate
sharing of fee: ".... it is the position of this Committee that any good
faith division of fees between lawyers based upon the extent of the
services rendered by each, and the degree of responsibility assumed
by each, is proper."33 Although this would seem to indicate that the
Committee suggests a proportionate sharing of fees based upon the
proportionate sharing of services and responsibilities, the Com-
mittee continued to take the position that it would neither measure
the proportionate contributions of cooperating attorneys nor provide
guidelines of any sort to the cautious practitioner.34
Many of the formal and informal opinions issued by the
Committee make the practical suggestion that cooperating attorneys
31. See note 7 supra.
32. ABA FORMAL OPINIONS No. 97 (May 13, 1933).
33. ABA FORMAL OPINIONS No. 391 (November 28, 1960).
34. Id.
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strike an agreement concerning the division of potential fees at the
initiation of their association.5 This suggestion represents an
exercise of common sense. Additionally, an ethical tribunal would
most probably enforce, as would a court of substantive law, any such
express agreement without comment or analysis based upon an
underlying presumption that, as attorneys, the parties to the
agreement negotiated it at arm's length. A rationale also evident in
Committee opinions provides for a similar presupposition where an
express contract has been struck between attorney and client.M
Other Committee opinions hold that where no express agree-
ment exists between cooperating attorneys, the attorney accepting
the referral of the matter is justified in billing the client directly
and assuming that the referrer will do likewise.37 Such a recom-
mendation must be based upon the conjecture that following the
referral, the attorneys did not cooperate in the handling of the legal
matter. It is submitted that this approach also rejects the special
partnership or joint venture presumption so often relied upon in
courts of law when resolving intra-attorney fee disputes.
Also worthy of note is a 1966 Committee opinion issued in
response to an inquiry by a medical malpractice "specialist" who
stated that he commonly divided any fee obtained in a case referred
to him on a two-thirds/one-third basis with the referrer and
expressly provided for such a division in the fee agreement signed
by the client. The Committee's response to the inquiry concerning
the propriety of such an arrangement was that, as it had opined in
the past,8 "on its face" such client consent to such an agreement took
the matter outside the proscriptions of Canon 34. Nevertheless, the
Committee did state that, ". . . Canon 34 would be involved,
irrespective of the 'agreement,' if the division of services and
responsibilities between you does not warrant the 33-1/3% - 66-
2/3% division of the fee, or the cooperation between you and the
forwarding attorney was no more than the referral."3
This observation seemingly requires that there be at least some
variance in the proportion of services or responsibilities performed
by the attorneys which correlates, in relative degree, to the fee-
35. ABA COMM. ON PROFFESIONAL ETHICS, INFORMAL OPINIONS No. 351,
unpublished, but annotated in ABA OPINIONS ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1967)
[hereinafter cited as ABA INFORMAL OPINIONS]. Cf. ABA INFORMAL OPINIONS No. 936
(April 26, 1966).
36. ABA INFORMAL OPINIONS No. 353.
37. ABA INFORMAL OPINIONS No. 351.
38. Id,
39. ABA INFORMAL OPINIONS No. 936 (April 26, 1966).
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sharing arrangement; i.e. the attorney sharing in the greater
portion of the fee must have performed the greater portion of the
legal services. It is likely, however, that if a referring attorney
performed the slightest service, other than the referral itself, the
Committee would not look further in reviewing the comparative
value of their contributions.
A review of the reported disciplinary decisions of state courts
based even in part upon the tenets of Canon 34 reflects that in the
few decisions found, it has been unnecessary for disciplinary
tribunals to consider the ultimate application of Canon 34, since the
cases before them provided clear violations of established ethical
standards. 40
A glimpse of the Bar's compliance with the mandate of Canon 34
can be seen in a 1951 report issued under the auspices of the
American Bar Association. 41 That report reflected that over one-
quarter of the attorneys surveyed still felt that the division of fees
between attorneys based upon disproportionate sharing of services
and responsibilities was either a common practice or not unprofes-
sional.
Thus, at the time the American Bar Association commissioned
its Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards in 1964,
neither the state courts in their resolution of intra-attorney fee
disputes or in disciplinary proceedings, nor the American Bar
Association's Standing Committee on Ethics in its formal and
informal opinions on legal ethics, had made any concerted effort to
apply the standard of Canon 34 mandating that any division of fees
between attorneys be proportionate with their respective sharing of
services rendered or responsibilities assumed. But in defense of the
courts and committee, it is also true that Canon 34, in common with
many of the aspirational Canons of Professional Ethics, provided no
concrete standards for a tribunal to apply when confronted with a
case concerning cooperating attorneys. Furthermore, it is logical to
assume that courts have long felt it outside their function and
jurisdiction to judge intra-attorney fee disputes based upon ethical
standards except where those standards, by court rule or judicial
fiat, have been elevated to the status of public policy or substantive
law.42 Disciplinary tribunals and agencies, however, felt more
40. See Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d 1446 (1966).
41. McCracken, Report on Observance by the Bar of Stated Professional
Standards, 37 VA. L. REV. 399 (1951).
42. See Palmer v. Breyfogle, 217 Kan. 128, 535 P.2d 955 (1975); McFarland v.
George, 316 S.W.2d 662 (Mo. App. 1958); Clark v. Robinson, 252 App. Div. 857, 299
N.Y.S. 474 (1937).
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comfortable in condemning the obvious ethical transgressor. Con-
sequently, only the referral or finder's fee was unequivocably
condemned.
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Dissatisfaction with the organization, practicality and standards
established by the amended Canons of Professional Ethics generated
the commissioning of a Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical
Standards in 1964 (Special Committee). Special Committee efforts
resulted in the promulgation of a new Code of Professional Respon-
sibility adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association on August 12, 1969.43 This proposed Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility incorporated "ethical considerations" as aspira-
tional standards for the practitioner and "disciplinary rules"
mandating a minimum level of required professional responsibility.
Both were organized under very general principles of professional
responsibility which maintained the label, "Canons." It was the
intent of the Special Committee to provide a complete embodiment
of legal ethics in one reference source.44
The Code of Professional Responsibility as now enacted includes
both Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules which purport
to control the division of fees between attorneys. The majority of
these guidelines and mimimum requirements of professional conduct
fall under the superfluous mandate of Canon 2, which provides that,
"A lawyer should assist the legal profession in fulfilling its duty to
make legal counsel available."45
In general, the applicable Ethical Considerations [EC] and
Disciplinary Rules [DR] of the Code of Professional Responsibility
parallel the mandate of prior Canon 34 which required that the
division of fees between attorneys be based upon the sharing of
services and responsibility. 46
Most directly concerned with the issue of attorneys' sharing of
fees is DR 2-107 which provides:
43. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrY, adopted by the ABA House of
Delegates on August 12, 1969, and as amended by the ABA House of Delegates in
February 1970, February 1974, and February 1975.
44. See Wright, The Code of Professional Responsiblity: Its History and
Objectives, 24 ARK. L. REV. 1 (1970); Symposium-The American Bar Association Code
of Professional Responsiblity, 48 TEX. L. REV. 255 (1970).
45. See generally ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CANON 2. See
also Ethical Considerations 2-7, 2-8, 2-22, 2-30 [hereinafter cited as EC]; Disciplinary
Rules 2-106, 2-107, 3-102, 6-101 [hereinafter cited as DR].
46. DR 2-107.
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DR 2-107 Division of Fees Among Lawyers.
(A) A lawyer shall not divide a fee for legal services with
another lawyer who is not a partner in or associate of his
law firm or law office, unless:
(1) The client consents to employment of the other
lawyer after a full disclosure that a division of fees will be
made.
(2) The division is made in proportion to the services
performed and responsibility assumed by each.
(3) The total fee of the lawyers does not clearly exceed
reasonable compensation for all legal services they ren-
dered the client.
(B) This Disciplinary Rule does not prohibit payment to
a former partner or associate pursuant to a separation or
retirement agreement.
DR 2-107 appears to require that attorneys must first obtain
their client's prior and express consent to the employment of co-
counsel, fully advise the client of any intended division of fees, make
any such division of fees only in proportion to the services performed
and responsibilities assumed by the respective attorneys and, lastly,
assure themselves that the total fee charged the client does not
exceed reasonable compensation for all legal services rendered to
him before they can justify any division of a total fee in fact.47
The provisions of DR 2-107 clearly go beyond Canon 34 in the
requirements of client disclosure and consent. Still, DR 2-107 does
not provide guidelines or standards to define, quantify or value the
proportionate amounts of legal services rendered or legal responsi-
bilities assumed.
Recent ethical opinions and court decisions concerning DR 2-107
are generally similar to those issued under Canon 34. The sole
opinion rendered by the American Bar Association's Standing
Committee on Professional Responsibility relying upon DR 2-107
states only that a division of fees with a referring attorney without
client consent and based upon no apparent service by the referring
attorney falls within the prohibition of the rule.48 Likewise, in a
1975 decision along the lines of the Missouri Appellate Court's
ruling in McFarland v. George, the Kansas Supreme Court relied
upon DR 2-107 to condemn a referring attorney's effort to collect a
47. Id.
48. ABA INFORMAL OPINIONS No. 1239 (August 29, 1972).
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referral or finder's fee which was allegedly justified by his reliance
upon a local minimum fee schedule which followed the "custom" of
permitting such fees.
In Palmer v. Breyfogle,49 the Kansas Supreme Court reviewed
the claim of an attorney for a portion of a fee which had resulted
from his referral of a casual acquaintance to the defendant's law
firm for the handling of a divorce action. In reversing the trial
court's award of a one-quarter fee to the referring attorney, the
Kansas court meticulously studied the facts and concluded that DR
2-107 had not been complied with. The court reasoned that the
plaintiff had failed to perform legal services or assume any responsi-
bility even though he had originally acquired the client and
allegedly attempted to "keep her happy" while the litigation was in
process. In reaching its conclusion, the court noted that the
plaintiff had not prepared any of the pleadings, had not appeared in
court and had absolutely no participation in the trial or settlement
of the matter, although he assertedly felt "responsible" for the
conduct of the case.5 1 The Kansas court also noted that the plaintiff
had never submitted a statement for the payment of fees and that he
kept no time records. Plaintiff based his claim for relief solely upon
his referral of the client to the defendant. The court rejected
evidence presented by the plaintiff and relied upon by the trial court
which indicated that the plaintiff had attempted to "counsel" the
client during the process of litigation. Moreover, the court weighed
heavily the testimony of the client which characterized the plain-
tiffs efforts as providing only "moral support" of a "friendly,
supportive nature."52
In attempting to define the terms "services" and "responsibility"
found in DR 2-107 and to apply these findings to the facts before it,
the Kansas court held:
We are convinced that merely to recommend another
lawyer or to refer a case to another lawyer and to do
nothing further in the handling of the case cannot be
construed as performing a legal service or discharging
responsiblity in the case. The service and responsibility
referred to in DR 2-107, before a lawyer is entitled to a
division of the fees, must relate to an act or participation
in or the handling of the case. The rule would be
meaningless if it were not so. The word legal "services" is
49. 217 Kan. 128, 535 P.2d 955 (1975).
50. Id at 969.
51. Id.
52. Id
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not difficult for the members of the legal profession to
understand, but the meaning of the word "responsibility"
requires careful analysis.5
Finally, the court concluded that a referral alone did not constitute a
responsibility assumed.4
The court's holding in Palmer v. Breyfogle clearly excluded a
mere referral from the "services" and "responsibility" referred to in
DR 2-107. Additionally, the court assigned importance to actual
involvement in the legal preceedings and rejected any guise of
"responsibility" which the plaintiff attempted to assign to his casual
social contacts with the client subsequent to the referral. Every
reasonable interpretation of the facts before the court led to the
conclusion that the plaintiff's claim for compensation was based
solely upon his referral.
In an interesting 1973 decision, the First District of the Illinois
Appellate Court denied an attorney's claim for a fee resulting from
personal injury litigation. The claim was based upon the conclusion
that his failure to disclose and obtain his client's consent to the
underlying fee-sharing arrangement with co-counsel constituted a
breach of fiduciary responsibility owed to the client. In Kramis v.
Smith Marine, Inc.,M the claimant attorney had initially been
contacted by Alan Kravis to pursue potential personal injury claims
resulting from a boating accident which had taken the lives of his
wife and unborn child and which had left his four-year-old son
permanently disabled. No fee arrangement between Kravis and the
referring attorney was either made or discussed in their initial
consultations. Prior to any referral, the claimant attorney remained
active in the handling of the probate and insurance matters
connected with the potential negligence claims. Thereafter, the
claimant referred the matter to a receiving attorney specializing in
personal injury litigation, who agreed that the referring attorney
would share in one-third of any fee recovered.
The initial receiving attorney later withdrew as a result of a
dispute over the fee arrangement made with the referring attorney,
and substitute co-counsel was obtained pursuant to an intra-attorney
agreement to share equally in any fee generated. At this juncture,
and for the first time, the substitute co-counsel prepared a fee
53. Id. at 967.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 15 Ill. App. 3d 494, 304 N.E.2d 720 (1973), rev'd, 60 11. 2d 141, 324 N.E.2d
417 (1975).
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contract for signature by the client and specifically included a
reference to both the referring attorney and himself as contracting
parties.
Two years later, a partial recovery was effected, and the client
inquired about the sharing of fees. The claimant-referring attorney
explained his requested share in the fee as "customary." A dispute
arose with the client, who claimed that the referring attorney was
violating applicable ethical standards. The client then formally
terminated his relationship with the referring attorney and made a
request to the court that the referring attorney's services be found of
no value. In the resulting trial, the trial court held that Kravis had
ratified the referring attorney's conduct and that the referring
attorney had rendered valuable legal services.
On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court held that as a matter of
law, the referring attorney had violated the fiduciary relationship
existent between attorney and client. The appellate court went
further to conclude that the referring attorney's failure to disclose
the fee-sharing arrangement justified an inference that he did so
intentionally. Rejecting the trial court's finding of ratification, the
appellate court held finally that the client's subsequent signing of a
fee contract did not vitiate the prior concealment and breach of
fiduciary responsibility.
In 1975 the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
Illinois Appellate Court and reinstated the trial court's judgment.57
As grounds for its reversal of the appellate court, the Illinois
Supreme Court relied upon a standard principle of appellate review
mandating that an appellant must rely upon a theory properly
presented and preserved in the trial court for reversal on appeal.5
The court also relied upon a written fee agreement between the
client, the referring attorney and the second co-counsel to conclude
that the client knew, or should have known, that the referring
attorney would participate in the division of any resultant fee.59
It is important to note in Kravis v. Smith Marine, Inc. that neither
the supreme court nor the appellate court referred to DR 2-107 or any
other provision concerning the sharing of fees, nor did they
discuss the referring attorney's justification that such fee-sharing
agreements were "customary." The failure of either court to cite
ethical standards might be explained by the parties' approach to the
57. Kravis v. Smith Marine, Inc., 60 Ill. 2d 141, 324 N.E.2d 417 (1975).
58. Id.
59. Id.
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case or the court's own understanding of the proper distinction
between ethical considerations and substantive law. However, this
rationale is not consistent with the Illinois Appellate Court's reli-
ance upon a breach of fiduciary responsiblity in its reversal of the
trial court, nor with the approach of the New York appellate courts
reviewed above which equates ethical considerations with public
policy, nor with the more recent decisions in McFarland v. George
and Palmer v. Breyfogle.6°
ALTERNATIVES
Often, criticism of the requirements of DR 2-107 and its
predecessor, Canon 34, is centered on their conflict with what are
identified as the "realities" of the practice of law. Normal practice
seems to require the use of referral or finder's fees and require that
cooperating attorneys be left alone to strike their own bargains
concerning the sharing of fees. These "realities" are based upon the
assumption that attorneys will not refer legal matters without the
guarantee of a fee and that it is impossible to make comparative
valuations of the legal services performed and responsibilities
assumed by cooperating attorneys. For example, the authors of a
work on lawyer-client employment agreements comment on DR 2-
107 as follows:
As a practical matter, this [proportionate division of fees
based upon sharing of services and responsibility] be-
comes a futile and unrealistic exercise in semantics.
Certainly at the time you refer a case to another attorney
you would, as a dedicated attorney, participate suffi-
ciently to have learned enough of their problem to make a
wise referral. Certainly you alone have an appreciation of
the value of your services in such instances. The propor-
tionate attorney fee to be allocated to you from the total
fees can be justified accordingly.
It is not uncommon for the referring attorney to be
required, on occasion, to further consult with counsel
doing the bulk of the work on the case. Likewise this
advice and availability for consultation is equally com-
pensable to the referring attorney. 61
60. Palmer v. Breyfogle, 217 Kan. 128, 535 P.2d 955 (1975); McFarland v.
George, 316 S.W.2d 662 (Mo. App. 1958).
61. I. ENT, LAWYER-CLIENT EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENTS (1967) [hereinafter cited
as ENT].
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In response, both ethical commentators and state courts have
clearly and unequivocably concluded that the mere referral of a
case, however "wise," cannot justify the sharing or division of a fee.
The underlying premise of the comment above is sound if in fact the
"not common" situation occurs where a referring attorney performs
actual services in the handling of the legal matter referred.
However, the implication that a mere referral coupled with a
willingness to "consult" with a corresponding attorney justifies a
division of fees must be rejected. It is this type of approach which
opens the legal profession to criticism of being solely a "money-
getting trade."
Recognizing these purported "realities" of the practice of law, a
1972 report by-the Chicago Council of Lawyers suggests, as a more
realistic and enforceable standard for the sharing of fees by
attorneys, the following revised form for DR 2-107, the emphasized
portions of which denote additions to the present rule:
DR 2-107 Division of Fees Among Lawyers
(A) A lawyer shall not divide a fee for legal services with
another lawyer who is not a partner in or associate of his
law firm or law office, unless:
(1) The client consents in writing signed by him to
employment of the other lawyer which writing shall fully
disclose (a) that a division of fees will be made, (b) the
basis upon which the division will be made, including the
economic benefit to be received by the other lawyer as a
result of the division, and (c) the responsibility to be
assumed by the other lawyer for performance of the legal
services in question.
(2) The division is made in proportion to the services
performed and responsibility assumed by each, except
where the only service performed by one lawyer is the
referral of the client to another lawyer and (a) the receiv-
ing lawyer fully discloses that the referring lawyer has
received or will receive economic benefit from the referral
and the extent and basis of such economic benefit and
(b) the referring lawyer agrees to assume the same legal
responsibility for the performance of the services in ques-
tion as if he were a partner of the receiving lawyer.
(3) The total fee of the lawyers does not exceed rea-
able compensation for all legal services they rendered the
client.
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(4) For purposes of the Rule "economic benefit" shall
include (a) the amount of participation in the fee received
with regard to the particular matter; (b) any other form of
remuneration passing to the referring lawyer, whether or
not with regard to the partivular matter; and (c) an
established practice of referrals to and from or from and to
the receiving lawyer and the referring lawyer.
(B) This Disciplinary Rule does not prohibit payment to
a former partner or associate pursuant to a separation or
retirement agreement.
(C) Two or more lawyers, not partners in or associates of
the same law firm or law office, may not jointly participate
in the performance of legal services for a client unless they
have entered into an agreement that complies with the
provisions of subparagraphs (1), (2), and (3).6 2
The standards proposed by the Chicago Council of Lawyers
require a more detailed disclosure to the client of any agreement
between cooperating attorneys to share in a fee. The written client
consent form must disclose the basis of the fee division, including
the amount of economic benefit received by the referring attorney
and the designation of the responsibility to be assumed by him in the
performance of necessary legal services. This proposed version of
DR 2-107 substantially permits the "custom" of referral fees so long
as the corresponding or receiving attorney fully disclosed to the
client that the first attorney referring the case to him is to receive a
specific economic benefit for the referral. More importantly, it
should be noted that this proposed revision of DR 2-107 would
require the referring attorney to agree to assume the same legal
"responsibility" for the performance of services as if he were a
partner of the corresponding attorney. This would seem to imply
that with the greater possibility today for legal malpractice claims,
the referring attorney operating under this provision may well be
susceptible to equal liability with his corresponding counsel for any
error committed after the referral. Finally, sub-part (C) of the
proposed version of DR 2-107 permits the implication that attorneys
could not share in any fee produced by their joint efforts absent
their adherence to the contractual requirements of the Rule. The
question then arises whether such a rule would or should be applied
in any attorney-client or intra-attorney fee disputes which are
placed before a court of substantive law.
62. CHICAGO COUNCIL OF LAWYERS REPORT ON THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY 23-24 (1972).
1976]
Hall and Levy: Intra-Attorney Fee Sharing Arrangements
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1976
24 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11
In the discussion following the proposed revision of DR 2-107, the
Chicago Council of Lawyers'observed that a considered prohibition
of referral fees, including a provision stating that mere referrals do
not alone constitute services performed or responsibilities assumed,
was "both hypocritical and unenforceable in view of the actual
practice of lawyers in paying referral fees.. . ."6 The Council is of
the view that any enforced prohibition against mere referral fees
would encourage attorneys to attempt to handle legal matters in
which they have had little or no expertise rather than to refer them
to more experienced or specialized practitioners without the expec-
tation of receiving a fee. This rationale directly contravenes the
mandate of DR 2-107 (A), which provides that no attorney should
assume the responsibility for the rendering of legal services which
he is not qualified to perform without the employment of co-counsel.
Furthermore, recognizing that referrals are often made on the basis
of established "trades" of different types of matters or upon the basis
of which attorneys pay the best price, the Council states that its
requirement that the referring attorney assume joint "respon-
sibility" for the providing of quality legal services somehow protects
the client from the potential harm caused by these practices.
Theoretically, this may be true. Practically, it would seem that
foremost in the mind of the referrer is the availability and amount
of a potential referral fee, not the possibility of a later assignment of
joint responsibility for an error in the legal services rendered.
With state courts often being unwilling to resolve intra-attorney
fee disputes requiring comparative valuation of attorney services,
the growing field of arbitration may pose an alternative for the
resolution of such disputes. An American Bar Association Special
Committee recently tendered a report and model by-laws which
incorporate arbitration as a means for the resolution of fee disputes
between lawyers and clients." Recognizing that the necessary
element of attorney consent to arbitration often makes the arbitral
process ineffective, the Special Committee recommended that if an
attorney against whom a complaint has been made refused to
submit to binding arbitration, the proposed arbitration committee
would nevertheless proceed with a hearing to determine whether a
legitimate complaint exists. The Bar Arbitration Committee would
provide the assistance of counsel to the complaining client if a
finding is rendered against the non-consenting attorney. Although
the Supreme Court of Alaska adopted rules for attorney fee review
63. Id. at 25.
64. ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON RESOLUTION OF FEE DISPUTES, A REPORT AND
MODEL BYLAws: THE RESOLUTION OF FEE DISPUTES [undated publication].
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committees by court rule in February, 1974, 65 the authors have not
obtained any specific information concerning the results of Alaska's,
or any other jurisdiction's, arbitration procedure. As in other areas
of dispute resolution, arbitration may well prove itself to be a viable
alternative to placing such disputes in the jurisdiction of either
ethics committees or courts of substantive law, which are both
already overburdened. It should be noted, however, that the
arbitral system proposed by the ABA Special Committee does not
expressly contemplate resolution of intra-attorney fee disputes, but
is rather attuned to those arising between client and attorney.
OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Conclusory observations concerning the ethical and legal pre-
cepts affecting the sharing of legal fees by attorneys necessitate a
bifurcated approach. Clear distinctions must be made in differ-
entiating the consideration of referral or finder's fees from the more
complex questions surrounding the sharing of fees by cooperating
attorneys.
The "custom" of compensating referring attorneys by payment
of a referral or finder's fee has been unethical since 1937. Never-
theless, every practitioner is aware of the fact that adherence to this
practice continues among attorneys to at least some degree. A
question then arises whether ethical prohibitions of this practice
remain justifiable in light of the avowed "realities" which are cited
in defense of payment of such brokerage fees. The Chicago Council
of Lawyers' proposed revision of DR 2-107 suggests that the
most practical alternative to prohibition of referral or finder's fees
is to recognize the necessity of such payments and require disclosure
of such arrangements.
The writers submit that the same considerations compelling the
enactment and limitation of Canon 34 apply today; the brokerage of
clients and legal business is unprofessional, and any argument
supporting the practice of bare referral or finder's fees can be based
only upon purely economic self-interest. But such a practice cannot
be condemned when a conscientious attorney can, within the
dictates of DR 2-107, easily justify participation in an agreed and
disclosed fee arrangement by performing valuable legal services or
assuming responsibility in the handling of a legal matter, so long as
his contribution to the effort is not contrived and can be competently
rendered within the limits of his professional capabilities.
65. See ALASKA BAR RuLES, PART II: RuLEs OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT
(1974).
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The request and payment for such referral or finder's fees
probably continues to arise most often in connection with personal
injury litigation conducted pursuant to contingent-fee agreements.
Similarly, problems concerning the division of fees by cooperating
attorneys probably most often arise in such contingent fee liti-
gation. The concept of the contingent fee contract as a remunerative
mechanism for legal services itself presents a topic of longstanding
dispute, the consideration of which goes beyond the limitations of
this work.6 6  However, it would appear that with increasing
specialization within the Bar and the seemingly unending expansion
of state and federal law, the incidence of intra-attorney referrals
should continue and expand where legal services are generally con-
tracted for fixed or hourly compensation.
The division of fees between cooperating attorneys who all
participate in the actual handling of a legal matter presents more
difficult problems. DR 2-107, as did its predecessor Canon 34, states
only that such division of fees is to be accomplished in proportion to
the services performed and responsibilities assumed by each attor-
ney. No guidance is provided as to how this proportionate evaluation
is to be accomplished, giving rise to the argument that such an
effort is futile and unrealistice.6 7
The comparative valuation of the respective services performed
and responsibilities assumed by cooperating attorneys is admittedly
difficult, as evidenced by the reluctance of both ethical committees
and courts of substantive law to accomplish such a valuation. It
should be noted, however, that neither forum has often been
presented with a factual situation which necessitates the compara-
tive valuation of attorneys' efforts. The typical dispute submitted
for resolution involves what is truly one attorney's claim for a
referral or finder's fee. Only in Kravis v. Smith Marine, Inc.68 did a
court reveal a factual situation presenting a potentially difficult
problem of comparative valuation, and there the dispute was one
between attorney and client and was decided on other grounds.
Attorneys attempting to avoid fee disputes with their brethren
and courts or ethical committees attempting to resolve such disputes
are not without some guidance in doing so. DR 2-106 provides the
following considerations for determining the reasonableness of legal
fees:
66. See F. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES (1964).
67. See ENT, supra note 61.
68. 15 Il. App. 3d 494, 304 N.E.2d 720 (1973), rev'd 60 Ill. 2d 141, 324 N.E.2d
417 (1975).
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(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and diff-
culty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to
perform the legal services properly.
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the
acceptance of the particular employment will preclude
other employment by the lawyer.
(3) The fee customarily involved and the results obtained.
These considerations go beyond the presumption, often expressed
in ethical opinions, that all attorneys appreciate the value of their
legal services. 69 Additionally, the decisions in McFarland v. George70
and Palmer v. Breyfogle71 provide practical considerations such as
the following to giide in the valuation of an attorney's services:
preparation of pleadings, client contact and control, participation in
pre-trial discovery and investigation, court appearances, partici-
pation in settlement efforts, and actual presence and participation
at trial.
The ultimate question then arises. Can a more definite standard
than DR 2-107 be provided to guide or control cooperating attorneys
in their division of fees generated by joint effort, and if so, what
enforcement mechanism should be employed to implement it? It
would seem from past experience that no matter how definite a
standard is provided, courts and ethical tribunals are not readily
disposed to accomplish such comparative evaluations. An additional
question arises whether any ethical standard governing the division
of legal fees between attorneys can or should be interpreted as
substantive law in the resolution of fee disputes which result in
litigation. The courts of New York, Missouri, and Kansas have
answered this question in the affirmative.72
An obvious means for avoiding such determinations is for
attorneys to agree expressly at the initiation of their relationship on
the exact division of any expected fee, or on their respective
responsibilities concerning the handling of the particular legal
matter aad its connection with the ultimate division of the fee. All of
this can and must be accomplished within the present requirements
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 73 The writers opine that
69. See ABA FORMAL OPINIONS No. 27 (May 5, 1930); ABA FORMAL OPINIONS
No. 204 (November 28, 1940).
70. 316 S.W.2d 662 (Mo. App. 1958).
71. 217 Kan. 128, 535 P.2d 955 (1975).
72. See notes 4, 7 and 17-21 supra.
73. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CANON 2. See also EC 2-19,2-
22; DR 2-106, 2-107.
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no more definitive standards would further aid in the avoidance of
intra-attorney fee disputes than would the Bar's general recognition
of the -requirements of DR 2-107 and its sincere effort to arrive at an
understanding concerning fees at the initiation of the relationship.
For the resolution of those intra-attorney fee disputes which still
occur, an arbitral system similar to that proposed for attorney-client
fee disputes by the Special Committee on Resolution of Fee Disputes
is suggested.74 Courts of substantive law and ethics committees are
already overburdened in attempting to resolve disputes of greater
import.
Most importantly, prudence and a general sense of professional
responsibility require that conscientious attorneys avoid any request
for or payment of referral fees. Practicing attorneys must be aware
of the apparent difficulties which surround any joint handling of
legal matters without first advising their clients of the requirement
for co-counsel and disclosing to them the fee-sharing arrangement
which has been contracted.
74. ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON RESOLUTION OF FEE DISPUTES, A REPORT AND
MODEL BYLAws: THE RESOLUTION OF FEE DISPUTES [undated publication].
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